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Abstract 
This paper aims to ascertain the effects of convergence in governance on investment 
decisions among a sample of 43 developing countries, using dynamic system GMM 
estimations. In an increasingly interdependent economic world, regions with good 
governance are considered to be areas of higher investment, as a result of further 
integration and collaborative action among member states. Since its foundation, in 1992, 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) countries have gone through a transition 
process and, to a large extent, this is about institutional transformation. Good 
governance institutions are an assurance to guarantee property rights and minimize 
transaction costs, thus creating an environment conducive to investment and growth. In 
this paper, we investigate the impact of BSEC on its member countries regarding 
convergence of governance institutions. We show that convergence has occurred within 
the region with respect to bureaucratic quality, control over corruption, law and order, 
internal conflict, ethnic tensions, but not to government stability and democratic 
accountability. The paper also calculates how much capital accumulation the region 
would gain by reaching the average institutional standards of the EU-12. This study is 
the first attempt in the BSEC region to investigate the link between regionalization and 
institutional convergence, at the same time as to quantify its economic impact through 
investment.  
 
Keywords: System GMM, Governance, Investment, Institutions, Convergence, Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation.  
 
JEL Classification: P4, E2, E6, D02 
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1. Introduction 
In an increasingly interdependent economic world, regionalization is considered 
as a means of more collaboration and further integration among member states. The 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) project is a regional economic co-operation 
arrangement established on 25 June 1992 by 11 countries, namely Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, 
Turkey and Ukraine. Currently over 350 million people live in the 20 million km2 of the 
BSEC region, which is a sizeable market by any criteria. The main aim of BSEC is to 
develop and diversify existing economic relations among its members, by making 
efficient use of the advantages arising from their geographical proximity. At the same 
time, BSEC regionalization is resorted to help transform centrally planned economies, to 
market economies and democratic regimes. Besides the security and political gains, 
BSEC countries also aim to improve economic and social integration through converging 
their governance institutions with the European Union (EU). The BSEC experience may 
though serve to prepare the necessary conditions for future EU membership.  
Good governance institutions are an assurance to guarantee property rights and 
minimize transaction costs, thus creating an environment conducive to investment and 
growth. Since its foundation, BSEC countries have gone through a transition process and, 
to a large extent, this has been about institutional transformation. Although this 
transformation certainly had a significant impact on the economies, the convergence of 
the institutions in the region has not been widely studied in the literature. This paper 
attempts to fill this gap. 
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To fulfill this objective, we first investigated the relation between governance 
institutions and investment for a sample of 43 developing countries through using 
dynamic system GMM estimations. Our approach has not been to just focus on specific 
institutions, but to be as exhaustive as possible in considering the institutional variables. 
To this end, we have categorized the various types of governance indicators widely used 
in the literature and grouped them into three categories: administrative quality (AQ), 
political stability (PS) and democratic accountability (PA) through principal component 
analysis. We have also formed two more general governance index (GOV1 and GOV2), 
using most of the information contained in these governance indicators, to check the 
overall effect of institutions on investment decisions. This categorization has enabled to 
measure the impact of a significant number of governance institutions. Actually, instead 
of putting highly correlated variables into the final regressions, or just picking up certain 
indicators, this paper utilizes all the available information in explaining the investment 
decisions. 
Our empirical results uncover the importance of institutional variables on capital 
accumulation. This is true for administrative quality (AQ), political stability (PS) and 
democratic accountability (PA), as well as for the general indices of governance (GOV1 
and GOV2).  This outcome makes of institutions a powerful engine of growth and 
confirms that institutions are part of the convergence of the economies. This result is all 
the more important in the context of the BSEC countries, where the scope for 
enhancement of governance institutions is still significant.  
This result has been related to the second objective of the paper, which is to 
investigate the impact of BSEC on the convergence of governance in the region. We 
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observe two types of convergence: the convergence within the BSEC region and the 
convergence toward the EU-12. This convergence has surely participated in the 
significant economic performances achieved in the region. Considering the possible 
adhesion of some BSEC countries to the EU in the future, we simulate how much capital 
accumulation would be enhanced if governance institutions reached the standards of EU-
12 average. The simulations indicate a large gain of such an institutional convergence and 
reveals in which fields BSEC countries have more scope for improvement. Overall, to the 
best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt in the literature to investigate the 
link between regionalization, institutional convergence and economic convergence in the 
BSEC region.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief account of BSEC 
countries in recent years. Section 3 explains the rationale behind categorization of 
governance institutions into three headings. Section 4 presents other determinants of 
investment. Section 5 lays down the econometric model and gives the regression results. 
Section 6 illustrates the institutional convergence within BSEC countries, as well as with 
the EU-12 region and simulates the possible investment gains from convergence of their 
governance institutions to EU-12 average. Finally, Section 7 makes the concluding 
remarks. 
2. Outlook of Black Sea Economic Cooperation Countries   
BSEC countries showed strong real GDP growth in 2002-2008 with 6.6 percent 
average annual growth, which displays that growth has been sustained at high levels over 
an extended period of time (Figure 2.1). The rate more than tripled the average annual 
rate of growth of the Euro zone economies and almost doubled the rate of the world 
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economy during the same period. Considering also that the growth rate in the second half 
of the 1990s up to 2001 was a mere 0.34 percent, the remarkable growth performance of 
the eleven-country economic block can be easily seen. In spite of the recent decline 
during the global recession, the outlook of the region remains though promising.  
Figure 2.1: BSEC Growth Rate 
 
At the same time, improvements in the business environment in the BSEC region 
have lowered country risk in the 2000s, leading to a positive trend in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the region. Once attracting only USD 8 billion in 2000, the region 
recorded a volume of FDI around more than USD 131 billion in 2009 (see figure 2.2). 
The highest annual jump in FDI flows has been also witnessed in recent years, as volume 
of FDI that flew into the region in 2006 hit USD 83 billion, compared to USD 47 billion 
in 2005, up by more than 75 percent. Similarly, the share of foreign investment attracted 
displayed constant ascent in the 2000s. However, regional development must be backed 
up by structural reforms in order to attain sustainable economic growth and faster 
economic convergence with the EU members. .  
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Figure 2.2: FDI Flows in BSEC 
 
 
3. The Governance Indicators 
In order to establish the connection between governance and investment, we need 
to identify the governance indicators and group them regarding their functionality in 
affecting investment. Various authors have aggregated certain indices to better capture 
the common features of the existing data. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) 
categorize governance institutions under six broad groups, meanwhile The World Bank 
(2003) uses two governance indicators by aggregating the relevant data for these features 
of governance. We categorize governance indicators a la Aysan, Nabli and Veganzones, 
(2007) and distinguish three broad categories of governance institutions, namely 
“Administrative Quality” (AQ), “Public Accountability” (PA), and “Political Stability” 
(PS). This has also helped to account for the multi-collinearity issue in using several 
highly correlated variables in the same equation. 
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  The first governance index “administrative quality” aims to reflect the ability of 
the government in preparing a business-friendly environment for investors. This variable 
incorporates three indicators from the International Country Risk Guide” (ICRG, 1999): 
(a) “Control over Corruption”, “(b) Quality of Bureaucracy”, and (c) “Law and Order”.  
“Corruption” is documented to affect economic activities adversely more so in 
developing countries, though developed countries are also not immune to it. Mo (2001) 
links corruption to low growth through reduced human and physical capital. Also Akai, 
Horiuchi, Sakata (2005) show that the effect of corruption on economic growth is 
negative and significant in the middle and long spans. The “Quality of Bureaucracy” 
index for ICRG implies the ability of the government to put into effect sound policies. 
Evans and Rauch (1999) examine the direct impact of bureaucratic quality on economic 
growth. A higher “quality of bureaucracy” index indicates that the government has 
expertise to govern without drastic policy changes. In the “Law and Order” index, law 
implies an appraisement of the durability and impartiality of the legal system, while order 
implies the popular observance of the law.  A reliable judiciary system reduces 
transaction costs for enterprises and sends positive signals to investors that rules of law 
are equitably and consistently protected and enforced. 
The second governance indicator “political stability” includes three variables 
from ICRG: “Government Stability”, “Internal Conflict”, and “Ethnic Tensions”.  
Political instability increases the vulnerability of an economy both in the eyes of its 
citizens and foreign investors. Several authors, using different indicators of political 
uncertainties, have brought empirical evidence that institutions associated with political 
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instability hamper aggregate investment (Rodrik, 1991; Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Le, 
2004).  
The third governance indicator” public accountability” consists of two indicators 
from Freedom House: “Civil Liberties” and “Political Rights”, and one from International 
Country Risk Guide: “Democratic Accountability”. Public accountability is an integral 
part of the investment climate of an economy since investment decisions are highly 
sensitive to the perceptions of the credibility of the political regime and policies. Public 
accountability, by leading to better economic performances lowers the discontent of the 
population and produces a more stable political environment in which investors carry out 
their businesses. A participatory political system shows the stability of social institutions 
and entails more support of the public to the political system.  The more open and 
participatory the political systems, the more responsible the governments get for putting 
in sound economic and social policies. Empirical studies display the positive effect of 
various indicators of democratic institutions on investment in the developing world 
(Pastor and Sung, 1995). 
In addition to these three governance indicators, we have generated two global 
indexes of governance: (GOV1) which summarizes the information contained in all 9 
initial indicators participating in (AQ), (PA), and (PS); and (GOV2) which excludes 
“Civil Liberties” and “Political Rights” from the main list. All the political and 
governance indicators have been aggregated by using principal component analysis 
(PCA) methodology. PCA is mathematically defined as an orthogonal linear 
transformation that transforms the data to a new coordinate system. PCA can be used for 
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dimensionality reduction in a data set by retaining those characteristics of the data set that 
contribute most to its variance. Results of PCA are given in Appendix 2.  
 
 4. Other Determinants of Investment  
The neoclassical flexible accelerator model is the most widely accepted model of 
investment. It is based on the idea that enterprises invest more if they get profit more. The 
determinants of investment in the neoclassical accelerator model are the expected 
aggregate demand (the accelerator), the user cost of capital, the wage rate, and the initial 
capital stock. We chose the real interest rate to capture the user cost of capital and the 
GDP growth rate to account for the accelerator effect.  
The role of human capital, together with physical capital, is also considered in 
growth models, especially after the advent endogenous (or new) growth theory (Pritchett, 
1996; Barro, 2001). In the neoclassical model, there is no explicit role for education and 
no externalities. Moreover, human capital enhances better governance institutions. More 
educated people become more competent bureaucrats (Galor et al., 2005). Therefore 
human capital is likely to affect investment through its impact on the quality of 
governance institutions. Recent growth theories have attempted to model these processes, 
both by introducing human capital explicitly into production functions and by allowing 
for the possibility of externalities, (Lucas, 1988).  Our indicator of human capital includes 
life expectancy at birth, and average years of primary, secondary, and higher schooling in 
the total population over 15 years old.   
 Macroeconomic stability is likely to affect investment positively. The 
macroeconomic stability indicator (MS) was obtained by using inflation and the ratio of 
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external debt to GDP. External debt represents the risk to an economy of encountering 
difficulties in reimbursing its debt and facing a financial crisis. Inflation can be disruptive 
to investment if it leads to unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances (see Fischer, 1993; 
De Gregorio, 1992).  
The effect of structural reforms is reflected by trade policy and financial 
development. The financial development provides more opportunities and incentives for 
firms to invest. There has also been a tendency to underline the role of the economic 
policies, especially of foreign trade openness on economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 
1997; Rodrik, 1998). These studies link trade policy and economic growth, where more 
openness brings higher economic results. Estimations usually include the rate of growth 
of exports and the summation of exports and imports as a percentage to GDP as a proxy 
of trade openness. We chose the private credit by banks and other depository institutions 
to proxy financial development and the ratio of export and import in total GDP to capture 
trade policy. As for the governance indicators, all structural and policy indicators have 
been calculated by using the principal component analysis (PCA) methodology (see 
Annex 2 for PCA results).  In terms of the source of the data, all variables come from the 
WDI database of the World Bank. 
 
5. The Econometric Analysis 
Our empirical model explains the share of investment in GDP. In order to account for the 
persistency in investment, we control for the lag of the dependent variable, what is 
consistent with the fact that investment decisions take time to materialize. First we 
introduce the three measures of governance separately, namely “administrative quality” 
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(AQ), “public accountability” (PA), “political stability” (PS). We then use the two global 
measures of governance; (GOV1) and (GOV1). Since the lag dependent variable is among 
the control variables, we estimate the model by using Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond 
linear dynamic panel-data estimation. The model is as follows: 
itiitititit vnXGIinvinv ++++= − 12110 ααα    (1) 
Where itinv  is the share of investment in GDP, 1−itinv  is the lag of the dependant variable, 
itGI  represents the indexes of governance (AQ, PA, PS, GOV1 and GOV2), itX1  is the 
vector of other control variables, and in  and itv  are the fixed effects and the idiosyncratic 
error terms respectively. As usual, i indicates the country and t represents the time of the 
variable. 
As explained in section 4, the real interest rate (Realr) and the GDP growth rate in 
the last year (grow) account for the neoclassical flexible accelerator representation, These 
variables are anticipated to have respectively a negative and positive impact on 
investment. The model also takes into account the GDP per capita to capture the 
convergence effect of the Solow growth model. Countries with lower GDP per capita are 
presumed to gradually catch up with the more developed counterparts, by having more 
capital accumulation over the time. A negative sign on the coefficient of GDP per capita 
is thus expected. Structural reform (SR), human capital (Hum) and macroeconomic 
stability (MS) are anticipated to play a positive role on capital accumulation Sign is 
however assumed negative in the case of MS, which contains a negative connotation in 
its composition, due to the inflation and debt ratio entering the indicator.  
As for the estimation method, we used the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond linear 
dynamic panel-data estimation technique. There are several advantages in doing so.When 
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OLS, or regular panel data models, are used to estimate equation (1), the results are 
biased due to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, 1−itinv . The lagged 
dependent variable is correlated with the unobserved panel-level effects, and therefore it 
is not exogenous as assumed by the OLS or some other panel estimations. The Arellano-
Bover/Blundell-Blinear dynamic panel-data model includes p lags of the dependent 
variable as covariates and contains unobserved panel-level effects. Since the unobserved 
panel-level effects are correlated with the lagged dependent variables, other standard 
estimators are inconsistent.  To account for this problem, Arellano and Bond (1991) 
derived a consistent generalized method-of-moments (GMM) estimator for this model. 
However, this estimator has certain deficiencies when the autoregressive parameters are 
too large, or when the ratio of the variance of the panel-level effect to the variance of 
idiosyncratic error is too large.  An improvement came from Blundell and Bond (1998) 
developed a system estimator that uses additional moment conditions. With their 
contribution, deeper lags of the lagged dependent variable become uncorrelated with the 
transformed error term and remain as instruments for the transformed lagged dependent 
variable. We employed this improved dynamic panel system when estimatin our model1.   
.  Equation (1) has been estimated on an unbalanced panel of 43 developing 
countries over 1985–2005 (see Appendix 1: Table 1.1 for the list of countries) Table 5.1. 
presents the estimation results for the three governance indicators taken separately (AQ, 
PS and PA, columns 1 to 3), as well as for the more aggregated ones (GOV1 and GOV2, 
columns 4 and 5).  
 
                                                 
1
 The Arellano-Bond robust VCE estimator is used in all the spefications.  
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Table 5.1 Estimation Results 
 
Investment (1)    AQ (2)PS (3)PA (4) GOV1 (5) GOV2 
0.35 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.35 GDP growth 
(8.21)*** (8.32)*** (8.87)*** (8.10)*** (8.08)*** 
0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 Real interest 
(1.86)* (1.90)* (2.03)** (2.03)** (2.00)** 
-0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 GDP per capita 
(-4.64)*** (-4.94)*** (-4.26)*** (-5.01)*** (-4.89)*** 
0.56 0.57 0.43 0.51 0.51 Human capital 
(2.57)*** (2.79)*** (1.91)* (2.40)** (2.44)** 
2.51 2.62 2.78 2.49 2.52 Structural reform 
(10.18)*** (11.42)*** (13.19)*** (10.30)*** (10.39)*** 
Macroeconomic -0.14 -0.12 -0.18 -0.95 -0.99 
Stability (-0.64) (-0.55) (-0.83) (-0.43) (-0.44) 
0.72 Administrative Quality 
(2.92)*** 
        
0.56 Political Stability   
(1.74)* 
      
0.34 Political Accountability     
(1.84)* 
    
1.05 GOV1       
(3.05)*** 
  
0.93 GOV2         
(2.73)*** 
0.5 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.45 Trend 
(2.14)** (2.06)** (2.07)** (1.95)* (1.97)** 
0.15 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.15 Investment (-1) 
(5.60)*** (5.79)*** (6.72)*** (5.73)*** (5.84)*** 
10.5 10.6 10.1 10.9 10.8 Constant 
(3.72)*** (3.92)*** (3.88)*** (3.90)*** (3.90)*** 
Number of observations 844 844 844 844 844 
Notes: (***) indicates significance at 1 %, (**) indicates significance at 5 % and (*) indicates significance 
at 10 % 
 
 Estimations confirm the importance of governance institutions for investment 
decisions. This is true for all level of governance. A high rank of “administrative quality” 
in the sense of a low level of corruption, a good quality of bureaucracy and better law and 
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order, leads to more capital accumulation. This result holds for political stability (as 
government stability, ethnic tensions and internal tensions), as well as public 
accountability, although with a lower level of significance in both cases (10 percent 
level). These results are confirmed with a high level of significance (one percent) when 
introducing the more global indicators of governance (GOV1) and (GOV2).,  
As far as other results are concerned, our estimations verify partially the 
neoclassical theory of the firm in the case of developing countries. In all specifications, 
the accelerator variable (GDP growth) has the expected positive sign and is highly 
significant (at the 1 percent level). This implies that anticipations of economic growth 
induce more investment. On the other hand, real interest rate turns out to be positive and 
significant (at the 10 percent level in the first two estimations, 5 percent otherwise), what 
is contrary to the user cost of capital argument. This finding indicates that investors 
continue capital accumulation in spite of increasing interest rates. It looks however quite 
reasonable considering the fact that, in developing countries, the returns from investment 
are rather high when the business cycles are favorable to the investors (and vice versa). In 
addition, estimations confirm the Solow’s convergence argument that countries with 
lower GDP per capita accumulate more capital in transition. The GDP per capita variable 
turns out to be highly significant (at the 1 percent level) with an expected negative 
coefficient.  
Other interesting outcomes concern structural reforms and human capital, which 
stand as significant positive factors on investment decisions (at 1 percent, and 1 to 10 
percent levels depending of the specification, respectively). Macroeconomic stability, 
however, does not appear as a significant factor in capital accumulation. This result 
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indicates that investment decisions rely more on fundamental and long term factors, than 
on short term aspects.  
 
Table 5.2: Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors 
 
     
H0: no autocorrelation,  (1)    AQ  (2)PS (3)PA (4) GOV1 (5)GOV2 
Prob > z| 
    
Order 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Order 2 0.1635 0.1952 0.2216 0.2798 0.2557 
 
Regression results also indicate a strong persistency in the investment decision. 
Lagged dependent variable displays a positive and highly significant coefficient in all 
specifications. The results also indicate a positive trend for capital accumulation. We 
have also tested the zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors. The results are 
depicted in Table 5.2. Null hypothesis is no autocorrelation. In all the specification, we 
reject the null hypothesis for the first moments, but not for the second ones. Arellano and 
Bond shows that there is a first order serial correlation in the transformed error terms as 
expected, and that the second order serial correlation is rejected. Hence, using the second 
lag of the dependent variable as an instrument for the transformed lagged dependent 
variable is feasible. 
 
6. Convergence in Governance Institutions of BSEC countries  
In this section, we investigate whether regional integration among BSEC 
countries has lead to convergence in governance within the region. We also ask the 
question whether this convergence has helped to reduce the gap in governance with 
respect to the EU-12 To carry this analysis, we have relied on seven of the nine initial 
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governance indicators considered previously. We find that BSEC countries have achieved 
within-regional convergence in almost all levels of governance. Comparing 2005 and 
1992, the year when the regional bloc was established, five out of the seven indicators 
have a lower standard deviation (see Figures 6.1 to 6.7). Although there are variations in 
results, and partial deterioration between 1992 and 1998, standard deviation for all 
indicators except democratic accountability and government stability have dropped 
significantly.  
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Figure 6.1: Convergence within BSEC
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In terms of the trends of governance, it can be observed that four out of seven 
indices have experienced improvements since 1992. Among the improved indices, the 
highest increase in levels was observed in government stability, followed by democratic 
accountability. On the other hand, the region saw deterioration in the corruption and 
bureaucratic quality indices. Since its inception, in 1992, the BSEC member countries on 
average also converged to the EU-12 average. It is observed that five out of the seven 
governance indicators have approached its comparator. Corruption and bureaucratic 
quality are the only two indices that diverged partially away from the EU-12 average. 
The rate of convergence was the highest for internal conflict, ethnic tensions and 
government stability, while it was the least for democratic accountability (Table 6.1). 
 
Table 6.1: EU12-BSEC Difference of Governance Indicators 
  1992 1996 2000 2005 trend 
Corruption 1.7 1.7 2.2 2.0 Negative 
Bureaucracy Quality 1.2 1.8 1.8 2.1 Negative 
Law and Order 1.7 1.2 1.7 1.4 Positive 
Gov. Stability  0.9 1.0 0.7 0.5 Positive 
Internal Conflicts  1.5 0.9 0.7 -0.4 Positive 
Ethnic Tensions 1.7 1.1 2.4 0.6 Positive 
Dem. Accountability  1.7 1.2 1.2 1.5 Positive 
 
In order to ascertain the impact of convergence in governance on capital 
accumulation in the BSEC region, we simulated how much investment would have gone 
up if governance had converged to the EU-12 levels. Calculations were done by using the 
proportion of each governance index affecting GOV2, the coefficient coming from the 
regression and the gap between BSEC and EU-12 averages. Results for the final year 
show that improvement in bureaucratic quality and corruption would contribute the most, 
with an investment ratio increased by 0.29% each year when the converge to EU-12 is 
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reached. The law and order and democratic accountability are the second most effective 
governance levels that have the potential to increase investment rate by 0.17% and 0.18% 
respectively (Table 6.2). On the opposite, improvement in government stability and 
ethnic tension appears to have a slight contribution to capital accumulation. Similarly, 
internal conflicts have shown a sizable progress in recent years as it converges more to 
EU-12 average over time. 
Table 6.2: Contribution to Investment of Governance Indicators  
  1992 1996 2000 2005 
Corruption 0.25 0.25 0.32 0.29 
Bureaucracy Quality 0.16 0.25 0.24 0.29 
Law and Order 0.22 0.15 0.22 0.17 
Gov. Stability  0.12 0.13 0.09 0.07 
Internal Conflicts  0.19 0.11 0.08 -0.06 
Ethnic Tensions 0.24 0.15 0.33 0.08 
Dem. Accountability  0.20 0.15 0.14 0.18 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
Good governance and institutions are an assurance to guarantee property rights and 
minimize transaction costs, thus creating an environment conducive to investment and 
growth. Since its foundation in 1992, BSEC countries have gone through a transition 
process and, to a large extent, this has been about institutional transformation. In this 
paper, we verify this institutional transformation for several governance indicators. 
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Institutional convergence has taken place within the region during 1992-2005 in the 
control over corruption, the quality of the bureaucracy, the law and order, the internal 
conflicts and the ethnic tensions. This transformation has helped the institutional 
convergence toward the EU-12 region as well. This convergence in institutions has 
participated in the significant economic performances observed during the same period. 
We illustrate in particular that this institutional development has materialized into 
investment. This relation has been tested on a panel of 43 countries over 1995-2005. 
Various dimensions of the quality of the administration (control over corruption, quality 
of bureaucracy, law and order), of political stability (government stability, internal 
conflict, ethnic tensions), and of democratic accountability (civil liberties, political rights, 
democratic accountability) show a positive and significant impact on investment. This 
result is all the more important for the BSCE countries, because of the scope of 
improvement in governance that still exist in the region. Filling the gap with the EU-12 
would stimulate further investment and growth, facilitating in return a future integration 
in the EU. By using our econometric results we show, in particular, that investment could 
increase a 0.58 percent per year if bureaucracy quality and control over corruption 
catched up with the EU-12 average. This increase would be of 0.17 and 0.18 percent per 
year respectively for law and order and democratic accountability. Improvements in 
government stability and ethnic tension, however, display a lower contribution to capital 
accumulation. These results constitute a powerful mean of appreciation of the economic 
impact of governance institutions. They are also the first to our knowledge on the role of 
BSEC on the convergence of governance of its member countries.  
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7. Appendix 
 
 
Annex 1 
 
List of Countries used in Regression Analysis 
 
Albania Dom. Rep. Malawi South Africa 
Armenia Ecuador Malaysia Sri Lanka 
Azerbaijan Egypt Moldova Thailand 
Bahrain El Salvador Nicaragua Togo 
Bangladesh Ghana Nigeria Trinidad Tobago 
Bolivia Greece Panama Turkey 
Bulgaria Guatemala Papua New Guinea Ukraine 
Cameroon Honduras Paraguay Uruguay 
Chile Hungary Peru Venezuela 
China India Philippines Zambia 
Colombia Indonesia Romania Zimbabwe 
Costa Rica Jordan Russia   
Cote d’Ivoire Kenya Sierra Leone   
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Annex 2: 
 
 
Principal Component Analysis 
 
 
 
Table A2.1: The Administrative Quality Indicator 
 
  Component Eigenvalue Cumulative R2  
  P1 1.87 0.62  
  P2 0.57 0.81  
  P3 0.55 1  
 
 
Loadings P1 P2 P3 
Corruption 0.57 -0.43 0.69 
Bureaucracy Quality 0.57 -0.37 -0.72 
Law and Order 0.57 0.81 0.03 
 
AQ = P1*(0.62) + P2*(0.19) + P3*(0.19) 
 
 
************************************************************************  
Table A2.2: The Political Stability Indicator 
 
  Component Eigenvalue Cumulative R2  
  P1 1.70 0.56  
  P2 0.80 0.83  
  P3 0.49 1  
 
Loadings P1 P2 P3 
Gov.Stability 0.52 0.74 0.41 
Ethnic Tensions 0.64 -0.03 -0.76 
Internal Tensions 0.55 -0.67 0.49 
 
 
PS = P1*(0.56) + P2*(0.27) + P3*(0.17) 
 
 
 
************************************************************************ 
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Table A2.3: The Public Accountability Indicator 
 
  Component Eigenvalue Cumulative R2  
  P1 2.29 0.76  
  P2 0.56 0.95  
  P3 0.14 1  
 
 
Loadings P1 P2 P3 
Democ. Accountability 0.50 0.80 0.07 
Political Rights 0.61 -0.29 -0.72 
Civil Liberties 0.60 -0.41 0.68 
 
 
PA = P1*(0.76) + P2*(0.19) + P3*(0.05) 
 
 
 
Table A2.4: The Governance1 Indicator 
 
Component Eigenvalue Cumulative R2 
P1 3.35 0.36 
P2 1.82 0.56 
P3 1.26 0.70 
P4 0.75 0.80 
P5 0.53 0.85 
P6 0.46 0.90 
P7 0.40 0.95 
P8 0.25 0.98 
P9 0.13 1 
 
Loadings P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 
Corruption 0.30 0.17 0.47 0.43 0.41 0.48 0.18 0.22 0.02 
Bureaucracy Quality 0.30 0.26 0.49 0.23 0.14 0.72 0.04 0.12 0.01 
Law and Order 0.39 0.38 0.06 0.13 0.33 0.02 0.37 0.66 0.01 
Gov. Stability  0.24 0.23 0.32 0.69 0.48 0.27 0.05 0.03 0.01 
Internal Conflicts  0.39 0.28 0.31 0.02 0.49 0.06 0.03 0.65 0.06 
Ethnic Tensions 0.29 0.01 0.51 0.49 0.42 0.30 0.37 0.10 0.01 
Dem. Accountability  0.40 0.22 0.27 0.16 0.23 0.27 0.71 0.22 0.11 
Political Rights  0.33 0.55 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.23 0.02 0.73 
Civil Liberties 0.34 0.53 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.36 0.09 0.68 
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Governance = P1*(0.37) + P2*(0.20) + P3*(0.14) + P4*(0.10) + P5*(0.05) + P6*(0.05) + 
P7*(0.05) + P8*(0.03) + P9*(0.02) 
 
 
Table A2.5: The Governance2 Indicator 
 
Component Eigenvalue Cumulative R2 
P1 2.90 0.41 
P2 1.22 0.59 
P3 0.89 0.71 
P4 0.71 0.82 
P5 0.54 0.89 
P6 0.45 0.96 
P7 0.25 1 
 
Loadings P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
Corruption 0.35 0.46 0.37 0.22 0.41 0.51 0.22 
Bureaucracy Quality 0.37 0.47 0.30 0.21 0.13 0.70 0.12 
Law and Order 0.49 0.10 0.03 0.39 0.34 0.12 0.69 
Gov. Stability  0.30 0.34 0.69 0.12 0.48 0.27 0.03 
Internal Conflicts  0.46 0.33 0.00 0.05 0.49 0.06 0.66 
Ethnic Tensions 0.29 0.49 0.55 0.17 0.43 0.40 0.08 
Dem. Accountability  0.34 0.32 0.03 0.84 0.20 0.06 0.17 
 
Governance = P1*(0.41) + P2*(0.18) + P3*(0.12) + P4*(0.11) + P5*(0.07) + P6*(0.07) + 
P7*(0.04)  
 
 
 
Table A2.6: The Structural Reform Indicator  
 
  Component Eigenvalue Cumulative R2  
  P1 1.29 0.58  
  P2 0.70 1  
 
 
 
 
 
SR = P1*(0.58) + P2*(0.32) 
 
 
************************************************************************ 
Loadings P1 P2 
Trade Policy 0.71 -0.71 
Domestic Credit 071 0.71 
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Table A2.7: The Human Capital Indicator 
 
  Component Eigenvalue Cumulative R2  
  P1 2.53 0.63  
  P2 0.87 0.85  
  P3 0.37 0.94  
  P4 0.21 1  
 
 
Loadings P1 P2 P3 P4 
Life Expectancy 0.53 -0.18 0.81 -0.14 
H1 0.28 0.94 0.05 0.13 
H2 0.56 -0.04 -0.50 -0.65 
H3 0.55 -0.25 -0.29 0.73 
 
H = P1*(0.63) + P2*(0.22) + P3*(0.09) +P4*(0.06)  
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2.8: The Macroeconomic Stability Indicator  
 
  Component Eigenvalue Cumulative R2  
  P1 1.39 0.69  
  P2 0.60 1  
 
 
 
 
 
SR = P1*(0.69) + P2*(0.21) 
 
 
************************************************************************ 
Loadings P1 P2 
Inflation 0.70 0.70 
External debt 070 -0.70 
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